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ISTHEBANK OFJAPAN A CLOSETMONETARIST?
MONETARY TARGETING IN JAPAN,1978-1988
AZS TRACT
This paper investigates whether the Bank of Japan has practiced a
nionetarist rule since 1975. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) published a report in
1975, stating that it would pay close attention to money supply (M2), and in
1978 started announcing quarterly the "forecast" (targets) of monetary (M2)
growth rate. Since 1975. the monetary growth rate has gradually declined,
and inflation has subsided without causing a major fluctuation in output.
This seems to be a successful case of the monetarist experiment. Has the EOJ
practiced a monetarist rule, i.e., an announcement and maintenance of the K2
growth target?
This paper reveals that it has not. The BOJ "forecasts" were quite
accommodative in that an unexpected increase in actual money supply would
make "forecasts" to allow a further increase in money supply. In other
words, a "forecast" did not behave like a "target" under a strict monetarist
rule. Testing a monetarist rule with "forecasts" is shown to be more
powerful than testing with the actual process, under some weak assumptions.
One of the necessary assumptions is that "forecasts" are rational
expectations, and the rational expectations hypothesis is not rejected by the
data. Thus, the conclusion of this paper is negative to a question posed by
its title.
Takatoshi Ito
Institute of Economic Research
Hitotsubashi University
Kunitachi, Tokyo 186,
JAPAN"Japan illustrates a policy that is less monetarist in
rhetoric than the policies followed by the United States and
Great Britain but far more monetarist inpractice."
(Milton Friedman (1985, p.27))
"[T]he Bank of Japan is now at its zenith as far as the
autonomy of monetary policy is concerned. ...Japan's
monetary management after the second oil crisis can be
regarded as one of the most successful such experiences in
any industrialized country. (Hamada and Hayashi (1985; p.83))
1. Introduction
While the rise and fall of monetarism prompted many debates and
research papers in the United States1 the Bank of Japan conducted a sound,
butnotloud, monetary policy. An important part of its policy is its
emphasis on the moneysupply(M2+CD) as an "intermediate target." The Bank
ofJapan announced thatmoneysupply would be watched closely in1975, and
thenthe Bank of Japan started to announceaquarterly "forecast" (mitshi]
of money supply (M2) in the thirdquarter of1978. Although it is called a
"forecast,"it could be regarded as a "target," if the Japanese central
bank prefers to bemodestand diplomatic in naming it. As the monetary
growth rate declined gradually, the inflation rate came down slowly.Real
income growth rate remained steady through the turbulent periodof the
secondoil crisis. For this kind,of performance, the Bank of Japan was
hailed by monetarists. However, there is a sign of change recently.In
response to a rising yen value, the money supply was allowed to soar in
1987.Although a surge in money supply would stir a concern among
monetarists,no sign of inflation exists in Japan at the end of 1988.
In order to understand the Japanese monetary policy after 1975, it is
crucialto determine how rigidly the money supplytargetingwas
implemented, and to analyze how much "forecasts" of the Bank of Japan
reflected its "targeting." However, aspects of the targeting by the Bank of
—1—Japan has escaped a close scrutiny. In this paper, I will examine various
questions concerning the money supply targeting by analyzing the Bank of
Japan "forecasts."Were "forecasts" by the Bank of Japan disguised
"targets"?Was the target steady? Did the Bank of Japan conduct the
policy to keep the money supply within the specified range? If monetarism
prevailed in Japan from 1975 to 1986, was it abandoned in 1981 when the
actual money supply soared? These questions will be investigated in the
following sections.In order to focus on money supply targeting, other
interesting aspects regarding the Japanese monetary policy will not be
discussed in the paper)'1
A main focus and contribution of this paper is an anlysis of the
"forecasts" announced by the Bank of Japan. One might think that it is more
important to examine whether an "actual" process, as opposed to "forecasts"
process followed a monetarist rule. An attempt of a monetarist rule is one
thing and an actual implementation is another. However, there are twc
reasons to prefer "forecasts" in the test of a monetarist rule.First, e
"forecast," a target of money supply, contains less noises than an outcome.
Actual money supply may deviate from a target due to unexpected demant
(creditniu.ltiplier) shocks.Hence, econometricinvestigationusing
"forecasts" would have a better fit and serve a more powerful hypothesis
testing (see Section 3).Second, monetarists always argue that it is
important not only to practice but also announce it beforehand a stable
monetary policy. Therefore, if a monetarist rule is intended and attempted,
it should appear in the "forecasts." The "forecasts" by the Bank of Japan,
which, contain a grain of "targets," provide us with a rare opportunity tc
test, in a pure form, a monetarist rule.
—2—Section 2 briefly reviews the monetarism debate in the United States
and a history on intermediate targets of Japanese monetary policy.Section
3 explains in detail the econometric issues involved in this paper. Section
4, a core of this paper, analyzes the statistical properties of and some
hypotheses regarding "forecasts" by the Bank of Japan. Section 5 contrasts
the processes of actual and target money supply and then test the
rationality of "forecasts." This section backs up the preceding section in
order to respond to a potential criticism.Section 6 summarizes the
findings of the paper.
-
2.Overview: U.S. vs Japan
2.A. United States: the Rise and Fall of Monetarists, 1.979-1982
The U.S. had conducted monetary policies in more or less a Keynesian
manner, with the interest rate targeting, throughout the l960s and l970s.
After the sharp increase in the inflation rate in late l970s, the Federal
Reserve announced on October 6, 1.979, a "new operating procedures" which
sounded like an implementation of monetarism.Chairman, Paul Volker,
announced a major change in monetary policy "to support the objective of
containing growth in the monetary aggregates... by placing greater emphasis
on the supply of bank reserves and less emphasis on confining short-term
fluctuations in the Federal funds rates."
The target cone for Ml was announced and efforts were made to keep Ml
within the range. However, the actual path of Ml broke out of the cone too
frequently. The weekly money supply announcement was closely watched by
the market in order to forecast the Fed reaction to the surprise in money
supply.Many studies, such as Engel and Frankel (1984), Ito and Roley
(1985) and Roley (1983), established evidences that the market believed
'-3—that the Fed will tighten after an unexpected increase in money supply.
Inflation fell butonlyafter the United States experienced the
recession of 1981-82, the worst since the Second World War.The Fed
permitted the money supply to increase beyond its target after the summer
of 1982, and the policy implemented in October 1979 was formally abandoned
in October 1982. After the monetary target was abandoned, money supply
increased at a faster pace: Ml increased only at 6.5% in 1981, but it grew
8.8% in 1982 and 9.7% in 1983. Despite repeated warnings from monetarists,
inflation did not materialize from a higher growth rate of money supply.
At present, Ml target is no longer announced.Monetarism has been
pronounced "dead" for some time (Dewald (1988) and. B. Friedman (1988)).
Milton Friedman was skeptical about the prospect of practicing a
monetarist policy in October 1979, and quickly disinherited the Fed from
monetarism. As early as December 1980, Milton Friedman complained that the
Federal Reserve had failed to keep its promise of October 6, 1979(See
M. Friedman (1980)). Monetarists claimed that, despite the monetarist
rhetoric, the Fed failed to implement a monetarist policy.The Fed
permitted Ml to fluctuate widely and even allowed it to swing outside the
target range. Thus, monetarists and sympathetic observers argue that the
experience from 1979 to 1982 was nothing like monetarists would advocate.
(See McCallum (1984, 1985) and Milton Friedman (1984, 1985).)
Nonnionetarists concluded from the experiment that it is neither
possible nor desirable to target the money supply. The monetary tightening
in 1981 due to an unrealistic goal in Ml growth hurt theeconomy.
Moreover, nonmonetarists argue that no inflation with a high monetary
growth rate after 1982 is a solid evidence that monetarism is wrong. (See,
for example, Benjamin Friedman (1984, 1988).)
—4—2.3. Japan: Was the Bank of Japan a closet Honetarist?
Between 1956 and 1973, the Bank of Japan permitted monetary growth to
fluctuate between fifteen and twenty-five percent per annum. The Bank cur-
tailed monetary growth when the international balance of payment became a
binding constraint, but otherwise relaxed monetary growth to finance
economic growth. In 1972, the HZ growth rate reached 26.5 percent.When
the oil embargo of October 1973 hit Japan, an inflation pressure was
already there. A combination of domestic overstimulation, a mistake of the
Bank of Japan, and quadrupling of oil prices caused the worst inflation
since the 1950s. The WPI inflation soared to 31 percent in 1974.
In order to curb the high inflation rate and to prevent its resur-
gence, the Bank of Japan decided to put more emphasis on money supply in
Japan.The Bank of Japan (1975) analyzed the causal relationship between
monetary aggregates and income. and derived a conclution that M2 had always
led the price level (WPI). In its manifesto, the Bank of Japan (1975)
announced that it would watch the the money supply growth more closely:
"In order to achieve price stability and to strive for the appropriate
development of the economy, it will be necessary to pay sufficient
attention in the future to the movements of 142 in the management of
monetary policy. ...Sincethe relationship between 142 and ultimate
policy objectives may change depending on regimes of the economy, it
is an inappropriate policy management to announce and to machanically
stick to the target of M2 growth rate.
In actual management of policy, the growth rate of the money
supply should be kept stable in cases when it is judged that no
particularly large economic problems loom, ...Money-focusedmonetary
policy in no way implies decreased importance for intereat rate
policy." (Bank of Japan (1975; pp. 10-11) and Bank of Japan (1987;
p.328 for translation of part of the above quote))
Since 1975, the Bank of Japan has declared HZ as an intermediate
target, and gradually decreased its growth rate. Fluctuations in the money
—5—supply have also been curbed as evident in Figure 1. The figure shows that
money supply growth rate was gradually declined, and so was the nominal CNP
growth rate, but importantly keeping the real GNP growth rate steady.Put
simply, the gradual decrease in the money supply growth rate reduced
inflation without reducing economic growth. This is what a monetarist would
preach.'Is the Bank of Japan a closet monetarist? Milton Friedman, a
founding father of monetarism, thinks so. As shown in his quote in the
beginning of this paper, Friedman praises the Bank of Japan for "practicing"
monetarism without vocalizing it. -
InsertFigure 1 about here
If the Bank of Japan practiced monetarism, the Bank abandoned the
principle, without announcing it, in 1987, when the M2÷CDgrowthrate
jumped to 10.4 percent from 8.7 percent in 1986. However, a care must be
taken in the comparison of the monetary policies by the Fed in 1979-1982,
and by the Bank of Japan in 1975-1986, since there are some technical
differences in monetary targeting of the two central banks.First, the
Bank of Japan has targeted the M2+CD, while the Fed targeted Ml. The Bank
of Japan thinks that Ml is more volatile in nature, and it is difficult to
target Ml or its relation to income and inflation is weaker. Second, the
Federal Reserve announced the actual statistics weekly, while the Japanese
monetary announcement comes only monthly. Announcements of weekly volatile
movements might cause jitterly reactions from the market. Third, it is
cosmetic, but the Bank of Japan announces its statistics in terms of annual
increasesinstead of the week-to-week changes.' Last, butmost
important, the Bank of Japan may not have treated its M2+CD "forecast" in a
way that the Federal Reserve treated Ml as a "target."
—6—3. Econometric Issues
Inthis subsection, econometric specifications of varioustests
performed in the next two sections are formalized and explained. First, the
money supply growth, 11(t), is the linear function of economic conditions
known at period t, consisting of a vector of public information, PIJ(t-l), and
that of private information of the Bank of Japan, PR(t-l), and economic
conditions developed in period t P13(t) and the Bank of Japan contemporaneous
(within period t) decisions PR(t-l):
(3.1) 11(t) ak+ b*PU(t-l) + c*PR(t-1) + d*PU(t) + f*fl(t) + u(t)
where u(t) is the disturbance term representing the unexpected errors in
controling money supply within period t, so that u(t) has a zero mean and is
uncorrelated with any of the right-band-side variable variables.The past
public information vector, PU(t-l), includes, for example, the past money
supply growth rates, M(t-l), M(t-2), ...,GNPgrowth rates, inflation rates
and other publicly available variables on economic conditions. The private
information PR(t-l) includes (i) financial market information that the Bank
of Japan collects but does not release to the public at the tine of
Hforecasta annoucements, and (ii) any monetary policy instruments that the
Bank of Japan has decided, but unknown to the public, to exercize in the next
three months. Changes in economic conditions in period t are divided into
the expected (at period t-l) part that is included in b*PU(t-l) and the
unexpected part,P11(t).Similarly, policy actions, affecting the money
supply, taken by the Bank of Japan in period t consists of the expected part
included in c*PR(t-l) and the unexpected part, PR(t).By definition,
E{Ptf(t)PR(t-1), PU(t-1)] —0and E[PR"(t)PR(t-l), PU(t-l)] —0.Given
that the Bank knows the true parameters, the expected money growth rate by
'V
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- -the tanic of Japan, E[M(t)B0J] (linear projection on PtJ(t-l) and PR(t-l)) is
(3.2) E(M(t):zoJI :EFn(t):puct-l),PR(t-l)1a k +b*P1.J(t_l)+c*PR(t—l).
However, the econometrician who is not informed of PR(t-l) would calculate
the expectation of the money supply growth using public information only:
(3.3) E[N(t)lecJ a Ic +b*PU(t-l).
Assuming that PR(t-l) and PU(t-l) are orthogonal, unbiased estimate of k and
b can be obtained easily. The forecast (target) money supply growth rate,
announced by the Bank of Japan for period tisdenoted by TG(t):
(3.4) TG(t) — f +6*pU(t..,1)+&*PR(t..l)+w(t)
where Ic is a constant, the error term w(t) represents rounding errors (in
deciding "forecasts") and other "trembling-hand" disturbances in setting
targets, which has mean zero and is uncorrelated with any information which
is available at period t-l. Since TG(t) is announced, the last equation can
be easily estimated by the econometrician, if a private information set PR(t-
1) is either empty or is uncorrelated with PU(t-l):
(3.5) TC(t) a k +6*P1J(t_l)+v(t)
where the disturbance term v(t) includes errors due to theprivate
information of the Bank of Japan and u(t): v(t) a &*PR(t-l) +w(t).
Coefficients, k, 6, and & do not necessarily coincide with the
coefficients of the actual money supply, Ic, b, and c unless the Bank of Japan
announce the "forecasts,which is the best forecast based on their
information available at that time, i.e., TG(t) a E[M(t)B0JJ, ("forecasts"
being "rational expectations"). This is examined and tested in Section 5:
Money-2.txt
-8-(3.6: RE) k —k,6— b,—c.
When rational expectations conditions are satisfied, a monetarist rule
is better tested with information TC(t), intention, on the left hand side
rather than 11(t). This can be easily understood by comparing the two





In order to estimate and interpret k and b, the first equation is more
efficient because its error term has less noises.This justifies the
procedure taken in Section 4, that is, I use "forecasts" announced by the
Bank of Japan rather than the actual money supply data in the test of
monetarist rule.
-
Onemay wonder what determines the relative accuracy of the Bank of
Japan announced "forecasts" against the econometrician's forecasts.The
forecasts error of the "forecasts" announced by the Bank of Japan is
FER(t,BOJ) :11(t)-TC(t).Hence, if the announcement is not the best
forecast of the Bank of Japan,
(3.9) FER(t BOJ) —(3.1)-(3.4)
—(k-Ia)+(b-b)*PU(t-l)+(c-&)*PR(t--1)+d*PU(t)+f*PR.(t)+u(t)-w(t).
If the announced "forecasts" are rational expectations of the Bank of Japan,
i.e., (3.6) is the case, then the forecast errors can be reduced
(3.10)FER(t BoJ, RE) —d*PU(t)+f*PR(t)+u(t)-w(t).
Money-2.txt
--Suppose that the econometrician is able to estimates the (3.1) and obtained
the kand b, then forecast error FER(t ec)N(t)-E[M(t)lecJ:
(3.11) FER(tl ec) —(3.l)-(3.3)
A A
— (k-k)-(bb)*PtJ(t-1)+c*FR(t-i.)+d*PU(t)+f*pR(t) + u(t).
In Section 4, the target function (3.5) is estimated and interpreted. This
is a test of monetarist rule at the level of intention. It is not necessary
for the test to be valid that the target process is consistent with a true
process.A monetarist rule is interpreted and tested at the level of
'forecasts." As described above, testing using TG(t) is more powerful than
using M(t) under the rational expectations assumption.
Section 5 is devoted to'an examination of various assumptions on which
the above test is constructed. Section 5.A estimates equations (3.7) and
(3.8) and obtained a better fit for equation (3.7), confining the above
theoretical prediction about why using TG(t) is better than 11(t). In Sec-
tion 5.B, the rationality of the Bank of Japan "forecasts" is directly
tested. If rational expectations (3.6) are true, the forecast errors 11(t)-
TG(t) is unbiased and uncorrelated with any variable contained in in.forma-
tion set PU(t-l) and PR(t-l). Usual tests are performed to confirm this
hypothesis. Therefore, this enhances the validity of procedure followed in
Section 4.In Section 5.C, the importance of the private information PR(t-
1) is will be examined, given an assumption that the econometrician knows a
correctvariables of information set Plflt-1). The forecasterrors,
FER(tBOJ) and FER(t ec) are compared. In the test, TC(t) is shown to be
more precise than E[H(t)PtJ(t-l)J in terms of the mean absolute (forecast)
error. In other words, the announced forecasts' TG(t) isbetter
forecasting variable than one constructed by the econometrician.
Money-2.txt
-10-4• "Forecasts" by the Bank of Japan
4.A. Official Description
Targeting and control of money supply by the Bank of Japan seems to be
at the heart of its conduct of the monetary policy that has received such
praises from monetarists and others. First of all, let us review how the
Bank of Japan itself described the forecasts.
In its publication, the Batik of Japan explains why it adopted "money-
focused monetary policy" and how it is exactly implemented (Suzuki (1987;
pp. 328-311).The following is a summary of the officiaL explanation
concerning its "forecast" announcement.
On the basis of these ideas, a change in monetary management occurred
in Japan, beginning in July 1978. Since that time, the Bank of Japan
has made it a rule to annuonce, at the beginning of every quarter, an
estimated value for the growth rate of the average outstanding balance,
of the money supply relative to the same period in the previous year.
This estimated value is called a forecast (mitoshi] and applies to the
current quarter. Originally, the definition of the money supply used
was M2, but the definition was changed to M2+CDs when the latter began
to be issued fin Nay 1979]. (Suzuki (1987), p. 328)
(T]he annual rate of increase is the focus of attention. ...Monetary
policy in Japan focuses on M2+CDs but does not determine 'targets' in
the strict sense of the word.Only 'forecasts' fmitoshi] are
announced. However, the policy actions of the Bank of Japan itself are
included in the determination of these forecasts, and in this sense the
forecasts represent increases in the money supply that the Bank of
Japan is willion to permit. (ibid, p.331)
The above descriptions tantalize the reader, who insists on knowing
whether "mitshi" is a "forecast" or a "target."One way to resolve this
issue is to examine characteristics of "forecasts" and to determine whether
"forecasts" deserve to be monetarist "targets."
4.B. Track Record
(1) Official Four-quarter Basis
The announced "forecasts" and ex actual growth rates of M2+CD are
J-ECONOM; MONEY-3.TXT -11-summarized in Table 1. Figure 2 plots the actual rate (solid line) against
the wean of the forecasts. The difference between the mean of forecast and
actual growth rates are shown in the "shock" column of Table 1 and the
vertical difference of the two lines of Figure 2. Table 1, the "large shock
column" also show thattheactual path strayed outside the forecast range
only eight times in ten years. Notable deviations, three straight quarters
of under-forecasting, occurred in 1987.
Insert Table 1 and Figures 2 about here
A few caveats are in order. First, in the original announcement, the
range of "forecasts" are not officially specified in numbers. Instead, only
descriptive verbal expressiohs of the range (e.g. "about" 10 percent) are
announced. The expression is interpreted numerically, using common sense of
the language, (e.g. "about" —+1-0.5 percentage point), and the ceiling,
mean, and the floor of the forecasts are recorded. This interpretation is
explained in Note 2 of Table 1.Second, since the announcement is
deliberately vague as expalined above, some rounding errors in announcement
are inevitable. For example, even if the Bank of Japan predicts E(H(t)IB0J)
the growth rate to be "10.18% +/-0.48%,"the Bank announces uses the
language, TG(t), "about 10%." The same announcement TG(t) may result from
E(M(tflBoJ) —"9.89%+/-0.46%."This is one of the sources of an error
term w(t) in equation (3.4).
Third, in the official announcement, forecasts and actual (realized)
rates are described in terms of growth rates (in percent) over the last four
quarters. Denoting the announced (mean) forecast of growth rate by TO, the
level of Ff2 by Ff2, and the Bank of Japan "forecast" of Ff2 for this quarter
by EN, the definition is shown as,
J-ECONOM; MONEY-3.TXT -12 -(4.1) TG(t) —1OO*[EN2(t)M2(t4)]/M2(t4).
Although a potential seasonality problem is avoided in this definition, an
actual money growth in three outoffour quarters covered in this forecast
formula is already known.Whenthree-quarters of a "forecast" hasalready
happened, it is no wonder that the forecasting record, Table 1 and Figure 2,
appears to be very good.
(ii) Quarter-to-Quarter Basis
As noted above, when a. quarterly forecast over the 12-month growth rate
forecast is announced, the last three quarters are known. Therefore, there
is a possibility thattheannounced forecasts mask a subtle change (or no
change) of "forecasts" in the quarter-to-quarter basis.This will be
explained in detail in next subsection.
The actual growth rate for the last quarter is announced at the same
time the "forecast" for this quarter is announced, and it is trivial to
calculate a quarter-to-quarter forecasts. Denoting the quarter-to-quarter
growth rate by QTG, the relationship is summarized as
(4.2) QTG —400*(E}12(t)_M2(t_i)]/M2(t.l)
The rate of change is multiplied by 400 in order to annualize the growth
rate.This conversion is applied separately to the high, mean, and low of
forecasted statistics.The actual monetary growth, inflation, and CM?
growth rates are also converted to the quarter-to-quarter basis and denoted,




J-ECONOM; IIONEY-3.TXT-13-Table 2 and Figure 3 shows the track record in the quarter-to-quarter basis,
correspond to Table 1 and Figure 2, respectively.
Insert Table 2, Figure 3 about here
Now compare Table 1 (announced, four-quarter growth rate) with Table 2
(implied, quarter-to-quarter growth rate) for the period 86:4 -88:1.The
announced "forecasts" increase gradually from 8.5% to 12.0 %.However,the
implied quarter-to-quarter forecasts decreased from 8.30% (86:4) to 6.69%
(87:2) and then jumped to 10.30% (87:3). Since there was a large jump in
actual rates in 86:3 and 87:1, even a small rise in four-quarter growth rate
in 87:2 implies a decline of the growth rate in the quarter-to-quarter
growth rate, Similarly, from 88:2 to 88:3, the quarter-to-quarter (mean)
growth rate does not change, while the' four-quarter (mean) growth rate
registers a 1.5 point drop.
Since the quarter-to-quarter basis contains more net information, most
analyses in the following uses this definition. Regressions using the f our-
quarter basis are also done, but does not present any different stories, so
they are not reported in the paper.
4.C. A Nonetarist Rule vs. Accomodation
Let us investigate how a new "forecast" is formed when the most recent
"forecast error" is revealed. Reactions of the monetary authority to
forecast errors reveal how monetary policy, is conducted. A monetarist rule
will prescribe a compensating decrease in the next quarter to a positive
forecast error, in order to keep a k% growth rate in the target period, say
a year.Accomodative approaches will allow higher money supply once it has
happened.In order to understand econometric implications of different
J-ECONON; HONEY-3.TXT -14 -hypotheses, consider the following example.
Suppose that the level of monetary supply, after detrending the kX, was
targeted to be constant for the last four quarters. The actual path was
right on the target from t-4 to t-2. But it was just revealed that money
supply jumped by I X from t-2 to t-l,(See Figure 4.) In the beginning of
period t, that is when an official "forecast" is announced, how does the
Bank of Japan target the money supply for that quarter?
Insert Figure 4 about here
There are three scenarios: Case 1 (Coinp1ete Accomodation). If the trend
is considered to be set and accommodated, the quarter-to-quarter growth rate
will be "forecasted" as 1% again from t-l to t; Case 2 (Bygones are bygones,
but no further accommodatiL If the jump was judged to be caused by a one-
time idiosyncratic shock, the monetary authority may want to keep the money
supply constant after rebasing; and Case 3 (Rigid Monetarism). If a rigid
monetarism is pursued, then the positive jump should be compensated by a
following negative jump to keep the long-run trend target is kept.
In addition to these three hypotheses, another interesting hypothesis
is that the money supply target is independent of economic conditions.
According to a rigid monetarism, money supply should be independent from
economic growth or inflation. Hence, target adjustments should also be
independent from either of them.If money supply management follows fine-
tuning as advocated by Keynesians, the money supply target will react to
conditions of inflation and growth.
The following two specifications are investigated.
(4.5) QTC(t)-QTC(t-l) —a+b*[QM(tl)QTC(t)]+c*QINFL(tl)+d*QCNP(tl)+e(t)




where j— 1,2,3,4.The (4,5) specification uses information of money
growth rate and others from t-2 to t-1.In the (4.6) specification,
qu.ater].y growth rates from t-S to t-4, from t-4 to ti, from t-3 to t-2, and
from t-2 to t-1 are separately taken into account.'.
Results of specification (4.5) and (4.6) are shown in Tables 3 (with
one lag) and Table 4 (with four lags), respectively. Table 3 shows that b
is estimated to be between 0 and 1. The hypothesis thattheestimated b is
equal to zero is rejected at the St level in most specifications.The
estimated b being larger than 0 implies that a recent "surprise" increase in
actual money supply would make the next 'forecast" to increase beyond what
has already happened (bygones). Table 4 shows that even if four lags are
allowed, the sum of coefficients on the past forecast errors are between
zero and one. Again, a hypothesis that the estimated b is equal to zero is
rejected at the St level in all specifications. Without information of
inflation or GNP growth rate, the sum of point estimates of bj. j—l,2,3,4,
is .71. This implies that if an increase in money supply above its target
by one percent will make the long-run target to increase by about 70 percent
in addition to adjusting the base of target to a realized level of money
supply. This is a strong evidence for an accommodative policy in the money
supply management.
Therefore, evidences are against a hypothesis that the Bank of Japan
practiced a strict monetarist rule. The estimated b implies that any
increase in the level of money supply is treated as bygones, and moreover a
2/5/89 J-ECONOM; NONEY-3.TXT -16-further increase will be accommodated. It is also shown that b is less than
1, so that a jump in money supply partially but not totally makes the trend
of increase.(In terminology of Figure 4, the finding implies that the
reality is somewhere between case 1 and case 2.)
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here
Insignificant estimates of c and d in Table 3 suggest that recent
inflation or real CUP growth rate does not add any information to the recent
"forecast errors."The last finding is a piece of evidence that goes
against a hypothesis that the Bank of Japan practiced the quarter-to-quarter
fine-tuning responding to inflation and CUP growth rate.The size of
accomodation, b, is quite robust in to different specifications with respect
to inflation and CUP growth. In Table 4, the magnitude of accommodation,
that is the sun of bj's does not change much, even if inflation and
economic growth rates in the past four quarters are also taken into account.
The sum of coefficients on inflation is .24. That is, "forecasts" of money
supply would increase if inflation becomes higher. This is hardly anti-
inflationary.However, the coefficients of inflation are collectively
insignificant at the 5% level, and significant only at the 10% level. Table
4 also shows that the CUP growth rates are insignificant, though a sum of
coefficients is negative, in determination of targets.When lagged
inflation and growth rates are collectively evaluated, it is not significant
at the 5% level (as shown in the last row of Table 4).
In sum, we learn that the Japanese monetary policy was conducted in
such a manner that was far from the monetarist k% rule.When an actual
money supply deviated from a target, there was no effort, expressed in
J-ECONOM; MONEY-3.TXT -17-forming the next target, to correct the deviation. A jump was not only
treated as a bygone, but also prompt a further jump in the same direction in
the future target. Neither inflation nor GN'P growth rate did not affect the
change in money supply target.
In the United States from 19Th to :982, the market correctly believed
that the Fed was conducting the strict monetary targeting, in that any
unexpected increase in the money supply (out of the "cone") would be pulled
back by a compensating decrease in money supply in the near future. In
other words, the market rationally expected that the estimate-of b in the
quarter-to-quarter regressions above to be significantly negative. Thus, as
many studies showed, the interest rate and the exchange rate responded to
the unexpected change in money supply within hours of money announcements
during the monetarist regime in the tJiiited States. However, in Japan, an
unexpected change in money supply announcements have not caused any response
in the exchange rate movements. (See Ito and Roley (1985) and references
therein.)The Japanese market was rational, in knowing that the Bank of
Japan would not try to compensate a surprise by a revease movement of money
supply in the near future.
5. Rationality of "forecasts
In the preceding section, it was shown that "forecasts" did not behave
like an announcement of kZ rule. If the Bank of Japan's "forecasts" were
not a monetarist targets, what were they? Is there any chance that an actual
path of money supply has followed a monetarist rule despite an accomodative
targeting rhetoric? This section will examine how forecasts were determined
and whether they were "rational," in that the forecast reaction function
was a correct conditional expectation of the true money supply process.
Honey-4.txt -18-5.A Determinants of "forecasts" and actual money supply
In this subsection, the actual and "forecast" money supply growth rates
are regressed on the same information set, in order to investigate whether
they respond similarly to past information. This is also an indirect test
whether the Bank of Japan forecast is biased in any significant manner.
Table 5 shows the estimated processes of actual money supply and
"forecast" money supply, in terms of the growth rate (panel 1) and the level
(panel 2). These tables show how similarly the "forecast" (target) and the
actual process responded to past information. The Chow test iè performed to
check whether there are structual differences between the two processes.
Insert Table 5 about here
Results can be interpreted as follows. First, the "forecast" equation
has a higher than that a "actual" equation, supporting that an actual
process contains more noises than a "target" process (as discussed in
Section 3). Second, the actual process responded negatively to inflation,
while the "forecast" process did not (in growth rates) or did so but in a
smaller coefficient. Third, coefficients other than inflation are similar
in magnitude.Fourth, both the actual and "forecast" processes show the
long-run effect (sum of the coefficients) of the lagged money supplyis
close (.703 vs. .827 in growth rates and 0.986 vs. 0.961 in levels).The
Chow test shows that there is no statistically significant difference
between the two processes (both in growth rates and in levels).These
results imply that there are no significant deviations in the two processes,




A direct test of hypothesis that the Bank of Japan forecasts is a best
conditional expectation given the information at the time of forecasting can
be formulated as the usual test of "rational expectations."If rational
expectations in the above sense holds, the "forecasts" are an unbiased
predictor of ex asrealizedvalues (unbiasedness test).Moreover,
rational expectations imply that forecast errors are not correlated with any
information which is available at the time of prediction (orthogonality
test), Each test is performed both in terms of growth rates- and in terms
of levels and results are shown in Table 6.
Insert Table 6
When the growth rate is used, the rational expectations hypothesis is
not rejected at the 5% significance level. When the level is used, the null
hypothesis is not rejected at the 1% significance level, but barely rejected
at SX significance level. Considering that the growth rate is used for an
official anr.ouncement, a rational expectations hypothesis is judged to be
accepted.In sum, an assumption that the Bank of Japan is announcing what
they consider the best conditional estimate of money growth rate.
As explained in Section 3, the information set on which conditional
forecasts are based contains the Bank of Japan private information.The
private information possibly includes its policy action to be exercised in
the next few months, but not yet announced. In the null hypothesis of
rational expectations, "forecasts" is formed taking into account the private
information, although the econometrician does not know its content. In that
sense, having "forecasts" announced by the Bank of Japan is a powerful test.
In fact, the procedure above is reminiscent of testing the rational
Money-4.txt
-20-expectations hypothesis with "survey data" (see Mishkin (1983)).
5.C. Were the Bank of Japan "forecasts" better than mechanical forecasts?
As explained n Section 3, if we find an econometric model (eq. (3.11))
which performs significantly better than the EoJ forecasts (eq. (3.9)), it
implies that either the Bank of Japan deliberately announces "biased".
forecasts (which is unlikely on the basis of the evidence in the preceding
subsection) or the private information is valuable enough to compensate for
rounding errors in announcement. -
Aftersome experiments, I produced two simple models that trace the
actual path of money supply reasonably well.Model 1 is simply a
autoregressive model of the level of quarterly money supply, and Model 2
uses information of both money supply and real GNP. The second model also
include the trend term. In both cases, the rolling regression is performed
to simulate forecasting using only information available at the time
forecasting.Then the one-step ahead forecast of I'12 level is translated
into the four-quarter growth rate.' Mechanical forecasts are compared
against the BoJ forecasts in terms of forecast errors.
Mean Absolute Error
BoJ forecastsMODEL-iMODEL-2
MAE 78:3-88:2 .348 .485 .478
MAE 83:3-88:2 .353 .393 .398
The mean absolute error (MAE) for an entire sample of 78:3-88:2 was
0.348 for the BoJ forecast, compared with 0.485 for Model 1, and 0.478 for
Model 2. For the latter half of the sample (83:3 -88:2), the BOJ forecast
MAE was .353, while the two models' MAEs were 0,393 and 0.398.The BoJ
Money-4.txt
-21-forecasts are better than the econometrician's best effort, although the
performance edge does not seems to be overwhelming. There are several ways
to interpret these results. The results imply that an importance of having
private information, PR(t-l) outweighs the possibility of non-honest
announcement, i.e., ik,61 b, c; the rounding errors w(t), and that
the econometrician may have imprecise estimates due to small samples, i.e.,
k 0k,b 'b,c c.Put differently, if rational expectations (3.6: RE)
is given, and if the econometrician has true parameter values, then the
results show that PR(t-l) is very important in forecasting the money supply
process. Yet another way of interpreting results is to regard results as a
support of rational expectations (3.6 RE), given that there are a few
variables which are private information of the Bank of Japan and that the
econometrician can try many specifications. For if rational expectations
were violated and if the information value of PR(t-l) was small, the
econometrician would be able to obtain a better forecasting formula using
?U(t-l) after many experimentations.
6. Concluding Remarks
Findings in this paper suggest that the Bank of Japan did not practice
what monetarists preached, contrary to a praise from U.S. monetarists.
Although the Bank of Japan announced a "forecast" which could be taken as
monetary targeting, the forecasts were flexible so that they would violate a
rigid monetarist rule. In particular, when there is an unexpected jump in
money supply, the base is adjusted to a new level (bygones are bygones) and
a further accomod.ation (b>O) in growth is allowed in the new "forecasts."
"Forecasts' by the Bank of Japan are found to be best conditional
forecasts by the Bank of Japan, because the rational expectations hypothesis
Money-4.txt 22 -is not rejected. The actual and "forecasts" processes responding to various
public information are very similar.Hence, non-monetarist "forecasts"
announcements can be regarded as a true reflection of the actual managment
of money supply.(As explained in Section 3, there is an econometric
advantage to use "forecasts" rather than cx post money supply.) The Bank of
Japan "forecasts" are better than mechanical forecasts, suggesting that the
private information of the Bank of Japan is important.
In the United States, it is acknowledged by many researchers that the
monvement of monetary aggregates during the monetarist experiment of 1979-82
has no resemblance to what monetarists preached, leaving a question whether
a monetarist rule was attempted and failed or it was not intended at all.
This paper shows that even in Japan, that the monetarists and sympathisers
regard as a dream land, monetarism in the strict sense was not practiced.
In fact, the Bank of Japan is not a non-monetarist in practice, but is
hesitant to look a non-monetarist in announcement. This is most evident in
its announcement form, the four-quarter growth rate, which hides the large
fluctuations in quarter-to-quarter growth rate forecasts.
One might wonder what made monetarism (or rhetoric of monetarism) gain
a popularity at one point in both the United States and Japan, and why the
idea is not completely dismissed by the central banks. The answer could be
politicalrather than economic:Justifying monetary supplyasan
intermediate target, it gives the central bank a convenient, and may be
justified, weapon when its tight monetary policy is opposed by other
branches of the government. Pierce (1984) suggested that "(p)erhaps the Fed
had not really embraced monetarism. It may have found that focusing on
money growth was a convenient means of absolving itself from responsibility
for the record-high interest rates that occurred." According to this view,
Money-4.txt
-23-the monetrist rulemay bea weapon thatacentral bank needs only in an
emergency. The Bank of Japan mayaswell maintain a monetarist rhetoric,
i.e., announcement of 'forecasts" just in case that the Bank of Japan needs
to absolve itself from responsibility for raising the official discount rate
against opposing political power."
Money-4.txt -24-Footnotes
1. For a good survey of the Japanese monetary policy, see Hamada and
Hayashi (1985) and Suzuki (1985).For institutions and regulations in the
Japanese financial markets in general, see the lank of Japan (1987).A
recent rise in the money supply growth prompted studies on the stability of
money demand function in Japan: See Bank of Japan (1988) and Ueda (1988).
2.Suzuki (1985) calls Japanese monetary policy "eclectic gradualism,".
which is in between Keynesian fine-tuning and a monetarist kt rule. Although
he diplomatically hedges his conclusion, his analysis (especially the obser-
vation about the experience after 1915) has a strong overtone of monetarists.
3.It would be interesting to study whether there are "real" differences
in the practices of the Bank of Japan and the practices of the Federal
Reserve after correcting for these differences. For example, had the
Federal Reserve announced monetary growth only monthly instead of weekly,
while compensating secretly week-to-week monetary fluctuations within the
month, would it have been more stabilizing to the economy? There is an
evidence in the foreign exchange market during the 1979-82 that the
Japanese monetary announcements were more or less ignored as "news," while
the Fed's monetary announcements were watched closely as"news" (Ito and
Roley (1985)) becoming a source of exchange rate fluctuations.
4. If we may interpret "forecasts" as 'targets1" and jump to a
conclusion, the Bank of Japan is judged to have resisted to a faster money
supply growth until 87:3 by targeting a deceleration of money growth.
Observing the large jump of 87:1, the Bank tried to slow down the money
supply in 87:2. Finally, in 87:3, the target followed the actualy trend.
This is hardly obvious, if we only watch the announced "forecasts" in terms
MONEY-FN.TXT Footnotes -1-of fourquarter growth rates.
5.The information content of right-hand-side variables in eq. (6), if
aggregated, is almost the same as that in specification (A) in the preceding
subsection.If not only the four-quarter growth rate but also how the
quarterly :growth rates fluctuate recently is important, then it is the case
for eq. (6) as opposed to specification (3). In a sense, if Table 1 is a
good summary of information, then specification (3) in the preceding
subsection is a correct one, while if Table 2 is a good summary, then either
eq. (5) or eq. (6) should be used, depending on the relevant memory.
6. It is discovered in the process of experiments that forecasting the level
first has better precision than forecastiug the growth rate directly.
7.An oral tradition among experts on the monetary policy suggests a
similar story in Japan. The Bank of Japan was politically defeated in 1972
and was "forced" to lower the discount rate against its will. If the Bank
had bad a sufficient political power to increase the discount rate then, the
great inflation of 1973-74 would have been averted. Therefore, having money
supply established as a "target," the Bank now has a contingent weapon in
order to implement a necessary tightening (or interest rate hike) when it is
needed.If this scenario is true, then I regret that, by writing this
paper, I will weaken the political power of its weapon protecting its
-autonomy.However, unlike in 1972, the Bank of Japan has well established
its credential by now, especially for its successful management, via fine-
tuning not monetarism, through the period of second oil crisis, 1979-80.
Thus, the Bank of Japan should realize that it could stand strong without a
safety blanket of money supply targeting.
MONEY-FN.Tfl Footnotes -2-Table 1: "Forecast" and Actual M2+CD Growth Rate:
Compared to the same quarter of preceding year
Forecast Actual Shocks Large shocks
QtrLow Mean High Act-Mean Outside (L,H)
78.311.0 11.75 12.5 12.1 .35
78.412.0 12.5 13.0 12.2 —.30
79.112.0 12.5 13.0 12.3 —.20
79.212.0 12.5 13.0 12.1 —.40
79.311.5 12.0 12.5 11.7 —.30
79.410.5 11.0 11.5 11.2 .20
80.1 9.75 10.0 10.25 10.6 .60 + 0.35
80.210.0 10.5 11.0 10.1 —.40
80.3 9.59.75 10.0 8.4 —1.35 —1.1
80.4 7.75 8.08.25 7.8 —.20
81.1 6.75 7.07.25 7.6 .60 +0.35
81.27.07.58.0 7.9 .40
81.3 9.09.5 10.0 9.6 .10
81.410.0 10.5 11.0 10.6 .10
82.110.5 11.0 11.5 10.6 —.40
82.2 9.5 10.0 10.5 9.2 —.80 —0.3
•82.3 8.59.09.5 9.0 .00
82.4 7.58.08.5 8.1 .10
83.1 7.0 7.58.0 7.6 .10
83.2 7.0 7.58.0 7.6 .10
83.3 6.5 7.07.5
-7.1 .10
83.4 6.5 7.07.5 7.2 .20
84.]. 7.0 7.5 8.0 7.9 .40
84.2 7.5 8.08.5 7.6 —.40







86.28.08.75 9.5 8.5 —.25
86.38.08.59.0 8.8 .30
86.48.08.59.0 8.3 —.20
87.17.58.08.5 8.8 .80 +0.3
87.28.59.09.5 10.0 1.00 + 0.5
87.39.5 10.0 10.5 10.8 .80 +0.3
87.411.0 11.5 12.0 11.8 .30
88.111.5 12.0 12.5 12.1 .10
88.211.5 12.0 12.5 11.3 —.70 —0.2
88.310.0 10.5 11.0 10.9 +.40
88.410.0 10.5 11.0
J-econom; MONEY-TA.txt Tables -1-Notes to Table 1
1. A quarterly M2+CD is a three—month average of monthly average
of balances. To be precise, before May 1979 no CDs were issued.
Thus, original statistics are M2 before 1979:3 and M2+CD on and
after 1979:3.
2.An actual announcement of a "forecast" does not contain the
range, but some wording suggesting some range. The following is







* 10.0dai, jakkan no fure wa attemo 11.0 zengo.
**thelOs, but could be around 11.0
3. Periods of "large shocks" are defined as ones in which
actual growth rates are either above the high or below the low of
the forecasts. In the former, the difference between actual and
high, in the latter, the difference between actual and low are
recorded.
Tables —2—
10.0zengo 9.5 10.0 10.5 around10.0
10.0dai 10.0 10.5 11.0 thelOs
10.0teido 9.75 10.0 10.25 near10.0
10.0jaku 9.5 9.7510.0 lessthan10.0 * 10.0 10.7511.5 **TABLE 2:Conversion to Quarter—to—Quarter Growth Rates
"Forecast" and Actual M2+CD Growth Rate:
Calculated to implied quarter-to-quarter rate






78:3 8.87 11.63 14.39 13.06 1.43
78:4 9.52 11.35 13.18 10.25 —1.10
79:1 8.94 10.76 12.59 9.93 —.83
79:212.76 14.60 16.44 13.84 —.76
79:310.14 11.98 13.81 10.91 —1.06
79:4 5.80 7.63 9.47 8.33 .70
80:1 4.62 5.54 6.46 7.93 2.39
80:211.42 13.29 15.16 11.80 —1.49
80:3 8.67 9.6010.53 4.42 5.18
80:4 6.03 6.97 7.92 6.13 —.84
81:1 4.05 4.99 5.94 7.11 2.11
81:2 9.66 11.57 13.49 13.07 1.50
81:3 8.57 10.45 12.32 10.76 .31
81:4 7.67 9.5311.38 9.78 .25
82:1 6.86 8.7010.54 7.21 —1.49
82:2 8.98 10.85 12.71 7.75 —3.09
82:3 8.23 10.11 11.99 10.25 .14
82:4 4.01 5.89 7.76 6.14 .27
83:1 3.18 5.07 6.95 5.31 .24
83:2 5.61 7.51 9.40 7.90 .39
83:3 6.04 7.95 9.86 8.21 .26
83:4 3.99 5.89 7.78 6.62 .74
84:1 4.57 6.46 8.36 8.16 1.70
84:2 6.20 8.09 9.98 6.44 —1.65
84:3 7.96 9.8611.76 9.23 —.63
84:4 5.37 7.25 9.14 6.78 —.47
85:1 6.74 8.6410.53 8.32 —.31
85:2 4.87 6.76 8.64 7.99 1.23
85:3 6.11 7.99 9.88 8.96 .97
85:4 5.82 7.70 9.58 9.54 1.84
86:1 6.49 8.3610.23 8.38 .16
86:2 4.23 7.03 9.84 5.97 —1.07
86:3 7.21 9.0910.98 1Q.34 1.24
86:4 6.42 8.3010.18 7.71 —.60
87:1 5.20 7.09 8.97 10.13 3.04
87:2 4.82 6.69 8.55 10.46 3.77
87:3 8.43 10.3012.16. 13.27 2.98
87:4 8.45 10.29 12.13 11.47 1.18
88:1 8.95 10.7812.61 10.97 .19
88:2 8.44 10.2712.10 7.74 —2.53









—0.70Table 3:Determinants of Targets: Quarter-to-quarter growth rate: One lag
QTC(T)-QTG(T-1) —so+b(QM(T-1)-QTG(T-1))+d*x(T-l)+e(T)
x —(Trend,Inflation, Real GNPgrowthrate), (..)—stand,error
QuarterlyQuarterly -2 Constant Act-TargetInflation GNPgrowth R /SEZ 0W/RHO
OLS -0.046 0.762 --- --- 2...,O 156 DW—2,59
78:4-88:1 (0.473) (0.303) SEE—2.420
ARt -0.005 0.768 2o.2l1 RHO—-0.304
79:1-88:1 (0.364) (0.273) SEE—2.355 (0.188)
OLS 0.240 0.755 0.005 k2—0.134
-DW—2.57
78:4-88:1 (0.702)(0.307) (0.123) SEE—2.620
AR1 0.161 0.760 -0.049 f&0.184 RHO—-0.297
79:1-88:1 (0.622)(0.280) (0.145) SEE—2.589 (0.198)
OLS -1.115 0.582 0.238 2_0.l54 DW—2.57
78:4-88:1 (0.857)(0.232) (0,188)SEE—2.400
ARt -0.904 0.592 0.193&2ozog RH0—-O.297
79:1-88:1 (0.799) (0.200) (0.185)SEE—2.353 (0.167)
OLS -1.230 0.589 0.030 0.245 a2—o 130 DW—2.566
78:4-88:1 (0.990)(0.237) (0.124) (0.193)SEE—2.433
AR]. -1.003 0.603 0.030 0.196 ft2—o.186RH0—-0.297
79:1-88:1 (0.890)(0.207) (0.113) (0.188) SEE—2.386 (0.171)
01.5 -0.046 cL762 &2_o.is& DW—2.594
78:4-86:1 (0.473) (0.303) SEE—2.587
APi -0.005 0.768 a2_0.211R}i0.—-0.304
79:1-86:1 (0.364)(0.273) SEE—2.545 (0.188)
OLS -2.385 0.687 -0.029 0.579 R2—0.223 DW—2.346
78:4-86:1 (1.460)(0.292) (0.145) (0.287) SEE'2.482
AR]. -2.020 0.726 -0.016 0.496 p.2—o.239RHO—-0..212
79:1-86:1 (1.424)(0.284) (0.144) (0.294) SEE—2.500 (0.213)
Notes: 1. First-order autocorrelations in the error term was corrected by thc
Cochrane -Orcutt method.
2. In this panel, the trend term is dropped because it is not
significant, when added, in any specification.
Tables —4—Table 4: Determinants of Targets: Quarter-to-quarter growth rate: FourLags
QTG(T)-QTG(T-1)—ao+bj*(QM(T-j)-TARCET(Tj)) +cj*QINFL(T_J)+dj*GNP(T_j)+e(T)
Estimation period 79:3 -88:1.method: OLS
(.) std.err.
Act-Target c Inflation d. GNPgrowth
j—2 j—3j—4i—ij—2 j—3j—4j—lJ—2 5—35-4
.48 -.55.30
(.30) (.30) (.28)




-.98 .39 .77 -.36 .16-.15-.24 .22 .41




.52 .36.71 -.77 .23 .29 -.35 -.21 .06
(1.68)(.27) (.31) (.30) (.30) (.20) (.21) (.22) (.22)
244 H0:b—0 H0: d—0
SEE—2 .293 F(4,26)—3 .851 F(4,26)—1 .403
DW—2.367 signif.— 0.0137 signif.— 0.26C
-1.43 .26 .95-.50 .06-.10-.32 .21 .43 .35-.28-.07 .1
(1.67) (.28) (.31) (.34) (.30) (.17) (.17) (.15) (.16) (.18) (.20) (.23) (.2
391 H0: b-O H0: c-d—O
SEE—1.058 F(4,22)—4.259 F(8,22)—2.157
DW—2.610 signif.—0.0105 signif,— 0.073








signif.— 0.078Table 5: DeterminantSofTarget andActual MoneySupply
1. Growth Rates:
4
actual process 11(t) —a+5bj*M(t.j) +c*QCNP÷ d*QINFL
J—1
4








78:3 -2.4220.3300.039 -0.0240.358 0197 -0.295 SEE—1..992
88:1 (1.944) (0.145) (0.151) (0.158) (0.152) (0.164) (0.165) DW —2.052
Target
-a2—o.492
78:3 -0.4400.3070.059 -0.090 0.551 0.1580.133 SEE—1.626
88:1 (1.587) (0.119) (0.123) (0.129) (0.124) (0.134) (0.135) DW —1.725
Chow Test, H0: (a, b1,
.. ., c,d) are the same in the twoeq.
F(7, 64) —.970, Significance level —0.461
Note:When a trend term is added, itisnot significant, and similar
results: F(8, 62) —.824,Significance level —0.584
2. Level
4
actual process logIl(t) —a+bj*log}1(t-i)+c*1ogGNP+d*1ogPRICE
i—i
4
target process logTG(t) —a+bj*log}I(t-i)+c*logGNP+d*1ogPRICE
J—l
method —01.5 (.)stderr
period a b1 b2 b3 b4 c d 2/SEE/DW
Actual 2_0 999
78:3 -0.3371.118 -0.203 -0.0040.075 0.115 -0.189 SEEO.00S
88:1 (0.536) (0.169) (0,252) (0.255) (0.176) (0.111) (0.090) DW —1.860
Target P2.-o.999
78:3 -0.0081.251 -0.265 -0.0290.004 0.098 -0.069 SEE—0.005
88:1 (0.526) (0.166) (0.247) (0.250) (0.173) (0.109) (0.088) DW —1.992
Chow Test, H0: (a, b1, ...,c,d) are the same in the two eq.
-
F(7,64) —.4l3 Significance level —0.890
Note:When a trend term is added, it is not significant, and similar
results: F(8, 62) —.396,Significance level —0.919
Tables —6-Table 6: TestsRational Expectation
1. Growth Rates
A. Unbiasedness, M(t)-M(t-1)—a+b*1og(TG(t)_x(tl))
Estimates and (st.er.) sample 78:4 -88:3
a b 2/DW
0.123 0.879 &2 —0.607
(0.273) (0.112) DW —1.50
B. Orthogonality ,M(t)-TG(t)—a+b*x(t1)









0.388 0.331 0.025 -0.001 0.1852
(0.064) (0.153) (0.126) (0.001) DW —1.668
2. Level
RE hypothesis:
H0 :(a, b) —(0,
F(4,34) —2.413
significance —0.06
A. Unbiasedness, log(M2(t))-logM2(t-1) —a+'b*1og(TGM2(t)log$2(t1))
Estimates and (at. er), sample 78:4 -88:3
a b
0.007 0.704 —0.48




estimates and (st. er.), sample —78:4-88:1
a b1 b2 b3
-0.062 0.215 0.025 -0.017 P?— 0.168
(0.037) (0.167) (0.018) (0.023) DW —1.707
Tables -7-
RE hypothesis:
H0 :(a, b) —(0,0)
F(4,34) —2.756
significance —0.04
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